Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior by Verboven, F.
L o c a lize d co m p eti t i on, m u ltim ark et op erati on
and col l usi v e b eha vi or
F rank V e r bo v e n
￿
No v em be r1 994
Abs tr ac t
T h is pap er studi es coll usi v e b eha vi o r i n a rep eat ed o lig op o l y mo del w i th l oc a l-
i zed comp e t i tion, also rein terpreted as a m o d e lo fm ul t im a rk et o p erat i on. Priv a te
i nfo rmation ab out the ri v al s’ past actions naturall y a ri ses from the se p ro duct ma r-
k et st ruc t ur e s. Th e resul ting co mm uni cation pro b lems impl y that ￿rms shoul d not
adopt stra tegi es wi t h to o se v ere pu nish men t s. In￿ nite gr i m puni shmen ts m a yb e
to o sev ere, fo rl a rge di scoun t factor s. The sta n dar ds ti c k-and-carro t pun ish m en t s
fro m the p erfect p ubl ic informa ti o nm o d el are alw a ys to o se v ere, for a l l disc o un t
f a ct ors. M o d i￿e d sti c k-a n d-carro t p uni shmen ts can st i l l b e used , though f or a
sma l l er range of di scoun tf actors than the st and a rd stic k-and -car rot p uni shmen ts.
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1 In tro duc ti on
As has b ee n recog ni zed at le a st sinc e Stigle r (1 964 ), the e ss e n tial proble m of enforcing
coll usiv ea g r e em e n ts in an o l igop oly con si s ts of dete cti n g and pun i shing pa st dev iations .
In a rep eated ga m e fram ew ork the re cen to l igo p oly l ite ra ture has expl or e ds e v eral asp e cts
of this e nfo rc em e n t problem in d e ta i l. T he presen t p ap er aim s to link the e nfo rc em e n t
prob l em expl ici tly to the s truc ture of the pro duct m ar k et. I c o nsi de ra ni ndus try w i th
lo cali zed c om pe titi o n, also rein terprete da sa ni ndus try with m ul tim ark et op e ra ti on .
Pro bl em s of priv ate i nform ation abou t t h e r i v al ￿rm s ’ pa st acti o ns endog e no usly a ri se
in suc h pro duct m ark e ts. It i s sho w n tha t these i nf or m at i o n pro bl em s create seri ou s
d i ￿ c u l t i es in b oth detec ting and puni sh i ng devi ations from a c ol lusiv e a gree m en t.
In t h e abs e nce o f a form al inform ation e xc hang e m ec ha nism , suc h as a trade ass o ci a-
t i o n , ￿rm s can not e as i ly o bserv e the ir riv als’ p ast acti o ns. In som ep r o duct m ar k ets the y
can nev erthe less m ak es u ￿ ci en t in fer en c es ab out the s e actions, based on the ir o wn p ast
reali ze d p ro￿ts. Thi si s the case i nah o m ogeneous g o o ds o l i g opol yw i th certain de m and ,
in w hi c h all ￿rm sc om p ete dire ctly with e ac h oth e r. In suc has i m ple m ark et an unex-
p ecte dl yl ow pri ce or high output b y one of th e ￿rm s results in a pro ￿t reduc tion to e ach
other ￿rm , from w hi c h th e unexp ec ted action can b e i nf erred. M o st pro duct m ark e ts ,
ho w ev er, are m o re com pl ic a ted a nd con ta i n asp ec ts of lo c alize dc o mp etition is l o cali ze d:
di￿ere n t ￿rm sm a yc om p ete di rectl y with d i ￿e ren t sets o f riv als. The ￿rm s’ pro ￿ts then
do no t dep e nd o n the acti o ns of all ￿rm si n the m ar k et. As a re su l t, the p oss i bil it y arises
that ￿rm sm ak e di￿ere n t infe rences ab out their ri v al s’ pa st actions. In pa rti cul a r, the y
m a ym ak e di￿eren t infere nces ab out the i ncide nc eo fc he at i ng i n a collusi v e a greem en t.
This c reates the foll o wi ng c ommunic ation pr obl em. A ￿rm who has priv atel y observ ed
c heating m a yn o tw an t to pun i sh the c heater: this w ou l da v oid a further pun i shm en t and
all ow the ￿rm to a t least con ti n ue to coll ud e with the other ￿rm s, who di d no t observ e
the c heating.
In a rep eated gam em od e l tha t captures the essen ti al p rop ertie so fl o cali ze d com pe -
t it ion , I a naly ze thi sc om m uni cation pro bl em i nd e ta i l. F or s i m pl ici t y ,If o c u s on sym -
m e tric puni sh m en ts, using a sym m etri cm od e lo fd e m and.
1
The resul ts of the ana l ysis
1
On the o ne hand, the us ed m o del o fd e m and i sm ore g e ner a l than Abre u’ s (19 86) m ode l b ec a us e
it r ela xe s the hom o gen eous go ods a s sum pti on. On the othe r h a nd, the use d m od el i sm ore sp ec i ￿c ,
b e cause i t ass um e sal inear dem and str uctur e.2
stress the i m p o rtance o f a ppropriatel yc ho sen puni sh m en ts for coll usion to b e s ustain-
able. When ￿rm s are patien t, i. e. for larg e discoun t factors , s om e punishm en ts m a yb e
to o s e v e re to induce c om m uni cation of priv ately observ ed c heating. In p arti cular, i ti s
s h o w n t h at the freq uen tl y stu di ed in￿ni te g r im punishm e n ts, as i nF rie dm a n (19 71), are
to o s e v e re fo r su￿c ien tly l a rge discoun t facto r s. F or this ra nge o f di sc ou n t factors, l ess
sev er e punishm e n ts then b e com e nec essa ry t o sus t ai nc ol lusion, for exam pl e ￿nite gri m
punishm e n ts. I n a ddi tion, i t is shown that the "s t a ndard " (sym m etri c) stic k-and -c a rrot
punishm e n ts of the p e rfect publi ci nfo rm at i on m od e l, a s i nA breu (19 86, 19 88), are al -
ways to o sev ere, for al l di sc ou n t factors. This result sugg e s ts that t h e com m un i cation
prob l em due to l o cali ze d com p etiti on hinders c ol lusion i nan o n trivi a l sense.
2
T o obtain
m ore c o ncre teness ab out the reduce dc o l lusiv e p os si bi li tie s , I cons truc t" m o di￿ed" stic k-
and -carrot puni sh m en ts, whic h tak ei n to a cc ou n t the com m unic at i o n pro bl em an d are
corresp o ndingly l ess sev ere than Abre u’s standa rd s t ic k-a nd-carro t punishm e n ts. Th e se
m o di￿ed punishm e n ts sus tain co l lusion for a larger rang e o f d i scou n t factors tha n F ri ed-
m an’s grim punishm en ts . H o w ev er, they ca nnot susta i n coll us i on f o r the en ti re range of
discoun t factors c o v er ed b y Abre u’ s standa rd stic k-a nd-carrot puni sh m en ts in the publi c
inform ati on m od e l.
Th e a naly s i s is further re in te rpreted i nam o del of mul timar ke t o p er ation absen t mul -
timar k et c ontac t,a s i tua ti on w he r eam ul tim ar k et ￿rm m ee ts di￿eren ts i ng l e-m ark et
com p eti to rs in di ￿e ren tm ark ets. M ul tim ar k et op e ra ti on absen tm ulti m ark e t con tact
m a y then hinder collusi o n d ue to the sa m ek ind of com m un i cation problem s. Thi si s i n
s h a r p c on trast w i th the established the or e tical re su l ts on mul tima rke t c ont a ct ,a s i tua -
tion where t w oo rm ore m ul tim ar k et ￿rm sm ee t eac h o the ri ns e v eral m ark e ts. B ernhei m
and Whinsto n (1 990 ) h a v es h o wn t ha t m ul tim ark et c on ta c tm a y facil itate coll us i o n, due
to a p o oling of the ￿rm s’ i ncen tiv ec o nstrain ts. B ecause of c ruci a l com m unic at i o n pro b-
le m s the ir r esults there fore do not turn o ut t o g ene ra l iz et oe cono m ic situations w i th
m ulti m ark et op e ra ti on but without m ulti m ark e t con ta c t. It w ould b e i n tere sting to in-
v estiga te whether thi s theoretic al i m pli cation can b e v e ri￿ed i n the gro wing em piric al
w ork o n m ulti m ark e tc om p eti tion.
3
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Thi si sb a s ed on Abr eu’s (198 6) The orem 14 , s tati ng that the re a r e no other (sym m e tric) punish-
m en ts t ha n the s ta nd a r d stic k-and-carrot punishm en ts that can e nf orc e a b e tte r coll us i v e outc o m ei n
the p ubl ic inf orm ati on m od el.
3
More re f e re nce s on t he the o r etical and em piri ca l m ul tim ark et l iteratur e are giv en i n se ction 5 .3
Th e re su l ts o f the a naly si se x pl ain the presenc eo f v ari ou s i nfo rm at i o n exc han ge m e c h-
anism s in indus tr ies w i th a com pli cated m ark e t structure . Suc hm ec ha ni sm sm ak e the
￿rm s’ pri v a te inform ation a b out p ast a c tions p ubl ic ,a n dm a y hence eli m i na te the com -
m unication proble m .A ni n tere sting ex am ple of an i nfo rm at i on ex ha nge m ec ha ni sm in
practic e is the A T P com puter system ,c om m on l yo wn e db y a grou p of airl ines in the
US. The A T P syste m pro vi des instan ti nfo rm at i o n of e v e ry pric ec ha nge ( o r future pric e
c ha nge) to e ac h o f the subscri bing airl ine s . See Barla (1 99 3) for a m ore detail ed discus-
sion. I f the so l e reaso n for these i nfo rm at i on e xc h ange m e c hanism s is the e li m ination
of the com m unic at i o n problem , then the a b o v e a naly si sm ak es a stro ng case for m aking
them p er se il le g al. Th e deba t eo ni nfo rm at i on e xc ha nge in an ti trus t i ss t i ll g oing on ,
b o th in the US a nd in Europ e .S c here r and Ross (1 990 , p. 34 7- 352 ) discuss the US a n-
tit ru st debate, ba sed on sev eral pas t l ega l cas e s. Phl ips (1 988 ) di sc us ses the " w o o dpulp
dec ision" , m a deb y the Eu rop ean Com m i ss i o n in 19 84.
Muc h of the prev ious l iter a ture on coll us i v e b eha vi or i n a rep eated oli go p o l y ha s
a ss u m e d p er f e ct pub lic inform ation ab o ut t h e ￿rm s’ pas t a c tions .
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A ￿rm can obtain
p erfec t inform ation abou t t h e r e le v an t asp e cts o f i ts c om pe titors’ pa st acti on s e i ther
dire ctl yo ri ndirec tly throu gh i nfo r m at ion on the pa st re al iz ed pri ces o r its o wn p ast
reali ze d pro￿ts . The m ost notable ex cepti o n to the p erfec t publ ic inform ation li terature
is Green andP orter (198 4). T he ya l lo w fo r rando m agg re g ate dem a nd s ho c k s so that
￿rm s canno t infe rw h e th e ra l o w reali zed pric e or pro￿t w a s due to a l o wd e m and or
duet o c heating b y one o f the ￿rm s. In t h e Gree n- P o rte rm o del ,h o w ev er, all ￿rm s re-
ce iv e the sa m ei nfo rm at i on . C om p eti tion i sn o n l o cali zed, so that an unexp ecte dly lo w
reali ze d pri ce or pro￿t is sha re db y all ￿ rm s. I ns u m , the G re en-P o rte rm od e l and its
subs e quen t generali zations
5
ar e m o del so f imp erfe c t pub lic i nfo rm at i o n. In con trast, as
ex pl ained ab o v e, the presen tm od e l with l o cal ize d com pe titi o n, a nd i ts rein terpretation
a sam od e lo fm ul tim ar k et o p eration abs e n tm ulti m ark et c on t a ct, g e ne ra te s pri v ate infor-
m ation ab out the ￿rm s’ past actions. T o the b e st of m y kno wledge, thi s is the ￿rs t m o del
in whic hs u c h p roble m s o f priv ate i nfo rm at i o n arise na turall y from the pro duct m ark et
structure. In this sense the re su l ts con tri b ute to the g ro wi ng I ndus tri a l Organ i zation
4
Be cause ￿rm sm o v es i m ul ta ne ously during e ac h per i o d, and conse quen tly do not obser v e eac ho th ers ’
curr en t ac ti ons, thes e gam es a r e so m etim es c a ll ed g a m es o f almost p erfe ct i nf orm ati on.
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See esp ecial ly F ude n be rg , Levine and Ma sk i n (1994 ).4
li terature, form al izi ng the li nks b et w ee nm ar k et structure, co nduct and p erform ance .
A few ga m e-theoreti c pa p ers ha v ea l read y a ddressed so m e a spe c ts of priv ate infor-
m ation ab out the pl a y er s’ ac tions in a rep eated ga m e. F uden b erg an d Lev ine (199 1)
as sum e p l a y e rs are only e ps i lon- rati o nal. If pl a y e rs are patien t, they m a y not m i nd b e-
ha vi n g sub optim al ly for s om e tim e .
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B en-P o rath a nd Kahnem an (1 99 3) and Kando ri
and Matsu shi m a (19 94 ) consider ra ti o nal pla y ers. Ho w e v e r, these pap ers as sum e that
pla y ers can m ak ee xpli cit publ ic anno unce m en ts at certain p eri od s i n tim e abou t thei r
obta i ned pri v a te inform ation. In con tras t with these prev ious con tri butions , the prese n t
pap er cons i ders rational pl a y e rs wh o are no t a bl et om ak e expl ici t publi c a nnoun c em e n ts
ab out thei ro wn p r iv ate i nfo rm at i on . F urtherm or e ,p l a usibl ee cono m ic en v ironm en ts are
considere d from whic h t he pr i v ate inform ation proble m s n aturall ye m e rg e.
Th ough the pap e r fo cuses on the s ustainabili t y of o ne sp eci ￿c o utcom e , the jo i n t-
pro￿ t m axim izi ng outcom e ,i ts e em s that the ana l ysis w ould re ad i ly e xtends to the
sus tai n abil it y of the w hole set of outcom es for whic h all ￿rm s obta i nm ore than thei r
one-s hot Nash pro ￿ts. Th i s then im pli es a N as h-threat folk the or e m .I t i s n ot so cle ar ,
h o w e v e r , w h e t he ra m i nm ax fo l k theorem w ould still a ppl y .
Secti o n 2 pre se n ts the m o del of lo caliz ed c om p eti tion. Sec tion 3 pro vide ss o m e pre-
li m i na ry obs e rv at i on s an d se cti o n 4 o btains the m ai nr e su l ts. In secti o n 5 the m od e li s
r e i n t e r p r e ted as a m o del o f m ultim ar k et o p eration. Conclusions and sug gested extensi on s
f o l l o wi n sec tion 6.
2 Them od el of l o caliz ed com p etition
There are sev eral w a ys to m o del lo c al ize d com pe titi o n. The b e st -k no wn m o del i s the
Hotel li ng m od e lw i th pri ce-setti ng ￿rm s. In this m o del ￿rm s are lo c at e do nal ine,
repre se n ting a one-dim ensiona l pro duct sp ace i nw h i c h ￿rm s are di￿eren tiated. Wi th
three ￿rm sl o cated a t di ￿e r en tp o i n ts on the li n e co m pe titi o n is lo caliz ed: a l tho ugh the
￿rm in the m iddl ec o m pe tes di rectl yw i th b oth the ￿rm to the le ft and the righ t, the
le ft and righ t ￿rm do not dire ctl y com p ete w i th eac h o ther. L o c al ize d com p etit ion is
6
F ur ther m ore , F ude n be rg a nd Le vi ne onl y c onsi d er info rm atio nall y c onnec ted gam es , i . e. g am es i n
whic ha m es sa ge c a na l w a y sb ep a s se d from one pl a y er to a nothe r, re g ard l e ss of whi ch s i ngl ep l a y er
m i gh t tr y to i n te rfer e. In m od el so f lo cali ze d co m pet i ti on, i np a rt i cu l ar i n the m o del de v el op e d in this
pap er , this prop e rt ym a y not ho ld.5
also pre se n ti nm or e c om pli cated s patial m o del sw i th p ri ce co m pe titi o n. It is p o ssibl e
to all o w for m o re than thre e ￿rm s, p o ssibl yl o c at e do nac ircl e ra the rt h a nal ine . The
pro duct s pace m a yc o nsist of m o re tha n one di m e ns i o n, pro v ided the re are e no ugh ￿rm s
rel a ti v e to the n um be r of di￿ere n tiating dim e ns i o ns.
7
In t hi s pap er I will c o nside r a nons patial setting to m o del l o cali zed com p etiti on .
Dem and is determ ined b y a represen ta ti v e co nsum e rw i th p re fere nc es fo r three g o o ds .
The pre ferenc es for t w oo ft h e s e go o ds are i nd e pe nd e n t. Ther e are thre e ￿rm sw h o
c o m p ete in quan titi es. T hi s spe c i￿c m o del g e ne ra te sl o c al ize d com p etiti o n of a sim i lar
form as th e Hotel li n g tri opol ym o del w i th price -s e tting ￿rm s. It has, ho w ev er, t w om ain
adv an tages for the purp oses of this pa p er. First, it is an aly tic al ly m ore tractable b ecause
of s om ec on v e ni en t sym m etr y pro p erti es a nd b e cau se of the con ti n uit y of the reaction
functi o ns.
8
Se cond , a nd m or e i m p ortan tly ,i t a l lo ws for a close c om pa ri s on with the
li terature o n col lusion i n oli go p o l ies w i th p erfec t publi c inform ation, i np a r t icul ar wi th
Abre u’s re su l ts in a h om ogenou s g o o ds o l igo p oly a nd w i th Denec k ere’ s (19 83 ) results in
a di ￿ er en ti a te d g ood s o l i g opol y . Despite the adv an tages of the us e dm o del ,i tr e m ains an
in teresti ng future researc ht o p i c to consider th e robu stness of the r esults in al terna ti v e
m o dels tha t capture as p ec ts of lo c al ize dc om pe tition.
2.1 D em a nd and pro￿ t s









































, i =0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3, is the quan tit y consum ed of go o d i. Assum e ￿> 0, ￿> 0,
￿ 6 = 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . Go o d 0 is the outside g o o d: th e util it y from i ts cons um pt ion is
inde p ende n t of the c o nsum pti o n of all other go o ds. The uti li ties from the consum ption
of g o o d 1 a nd go o d 3 are indep enden to f e ac h other. The uti li tie sf ro m the consum ption
of go o d 1 a nd 2 , and o f go o d 2 and 3 a re ,h o w ev er, i n terdep enden t: go o d 1 a nd 2 , and
go o d 2 and 3, a r e substitutes for ￿> 0 , the y are com ple m en t sf o r ￿< 0. Solvi ng the
repre se n tativ e cons um er’s util it ym ax im i zation p r o ble m sub ject to th e budget cons tr ai n t
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Ander son, de P al m a and Thi s se (198 9) pr o vide s u￿cien tc o nd i tions on the dim e nsio no f th e pr odu ct
spac e fo rc o m p e titi on to b e lo cal ize d.
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Spati al m o dels wi th price -set ti ng ￿rm st y picall y gene rate di s con ti n uous re action funct i ons, m aki ng









,w h e re y is i ncom e and p
i
i s the pric eo fg o o di ,p
0
=1 , g i v e s the i n v e rse
dem a nd equations for g o o d 1 , 2 a nd 3:
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) = 2 ] :
Th e re are thre e ￿rm s. Eac h ￿rm i c ho os e s t o p r odu c e the qua n tit yo fa s i n gle go o d i,
q
i
, g i v e n the qua n tit yc hosen b y the other ￿rm s. Norm ali zi ng m arginal cost to z ero and
ignoring ￿xe dc o sts, ￿rm i ’s r ea l iz ed pro ￿t ￿
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Th e s e pro￿t eq ua ti on s r e v e a l that com p eti tion i sl o c al iz ed i n the fo l lo wing sense: ￿ r m
i’ s pro￿t, i 6= 2 , direc tly dep ends o nl y o n its o wn quan ti t yc ho i ce and the q ua n ti t yo f
￿ r m 2 , and not o n the qua n tit yc hoice of th e thi rd ￿rm . In o ther w ords, ￿rm 1 a nd ￿ r m
3 do not dir ectl yc om pe te wi th eac h other; they o nl yc om pe te i ndire ctly throug h the
in teracti on wi th the com m o n com p etitor ￿ r m 2. This struc tu re of lo c al ize dc om p eti tion
is s i m i lar to the stan dard H ot e ll ing m o del with p r ice - setti ng ￿rm s. Usi ng this ana l og y ,
one m a yc al l ￿rm s 1 a nd 2 , and ￿rm s 2 a nd 3 , "neigh bor i ng " ￿ rm s, where a s ￿rm s 1 and
3 are "no n-nei gh b ors ". T hi s ana l og y sho ul d not, of cou rse ,b et a k en li terally .
D e sp i te the l o cali ze d nature of com p etiti o n, the sp ec i￿c func tiona l fo rm o f the pro￿t
eq u ati o ns generates som e con v enie n t sym m etry prop er ties. Th e s e prop e rties w i ll b e
ex pl oited b elo w.
2.2 Infor m ati on and b el i efs
In the o ne-sho t ga m e ￿rm si n teract for o nl y one p er io d. A stra te g y for ￿rm i is then
sim pl y a qua n tit yc hoic e inde p ende n t o f the pa st. I n the in￿nite ho ri zon gam e, ￿rm s
in teract for a n i n￿nite n um be r o f pe r i ods . I ne v e ry p erio d t eac h ￿ rm m a yt he n cond i tion
its o wn q ua n ti t yc ho i ce on the observ ed s e quence of the ￿rm s’ pa st quan tit yc h oic es. This
fact li es a t the ba si s of p oten ti a l inform ation proble m s in the in￿nite horiz o n ga m e.
De ￿ne ￿rm i’ s history h
t￿1
i
at the end of p eri od t ￿ 1, t ￿ 2, a s th e seque nce o f its
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). Firm i’s nu l l -h istory at the end of p erio d 0
is de￿ned a s h
0
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an d t h e se quence of its o wn reali zed pro ￿ts (￿
1
i
;: : :; ￿
t￿ 1
i
). F rom this inform ation
eac h ￿ rm can m ak es o m e infe rences ab out the other ￿rm s ’ history . Du e to the lo c al iz ed
structure of c om p eti tion, these i nferenc es a re nece s saril yi m pe rfec t. U p on obs e rving
thei r o wn histo ry a nd the ir o wn pas t realiz ed pro￿ts , ￿rm 1 an d ￿rm 3 can infer ￿ r m 2’s
history , with w hom they dire ctly c om p ete , but they canno t infe re ac h others’ history .I n












). A ss um e for s i m pli ci t y that








This the n giv es the foll o wi ng inform ation
for e ac h ￿rm i.

















He nce, ￿rm 2 w ho i s dire ctl yc om pe t ing with a l l o ther ￿rm s, is p erfec tly inform e d ab out
the hi s tory of all ￿rm s. Fi rm 1 a nd 3 a re o nl yi m p erf ectl y inform e d. Cle ar l y , the
lo cali zed structure of com pe titi o n generates this priv ate inform ation structure. I ti si n
sha rp con trast wi th the stand ard a pproa c h with pu bl ic i nfo rm at i on .
Gi v e n t h e i r i m pe rfe ct inform ation, ￿rm 1 a nd ￿rm 3 m us t ha v eab e lief abou t e ac h
o t h e r ’ s hi s to ry at eac h p erio d t an d a ft er e v e ry p o ssibl e o bserv ed hi sto ry . The e quil ibri um
concept wil l req uire these b eli efs to b e cons i sten t with the stra te gi es.
2.3 Strate gi e s a nd m ac hi nes










a ssigns a q ua n ti t y q
t
i
to ev er y po ss i bl e obs e rv e d histo ry . I n pa rti cular, for ￿rm i,




























) i s the quan tit y t ob ec ho sen in p eri od t









). Assum i n g ￿rm sd i sc ou n t the future at a
com m o n fa c to r ￿ , the (no rm al iz ed) pre se n tv al u e of eac h ￿rm i’s con tin ua ti o n pro ￿t from
foll o wi ng its stra te gy ,g i v e n that the other ￿rm s fol lo w the ir s t ra te gy ,i sa t a n y p eri od t
9
Thi s can b e justi￿e d i f￿ r m 2c a n dec i de i n eac h p erio d whe ther o r not to s p end a na m oun t ￿ up on


















f or som e
￿ . In t he Hote l li ng m o del of l oca l ize d com p etitio n, ￿rm 2 could b e assum ed to b e abl e to insp e ct t he
actual cus tom er s t ha th es e r v ed in the past in order to i de n ti fy the price s c harge d b y the left ne i gh bo r
from the pri ce s o bs erv ed b y the rig h tn e i gh b or.8
after ev ery obs e rv e dh i s tory:





























)] , i 6=2 ;







































T h e n o r m ali zation factor (1 ￿ ￿ ) serv es to m eas ure the one-sho t pro ￿ts and the co n tin-
uation pro￿ts i n the sam e units.
It wil l b em ore con v enie n t to use the l a ngua ge of m ac hi nes to descr ib e s tr a tegi es in
the rep eated g am e .E a c h ￿rm i ’s m ac hi ne is in te nded a s a n ab stracti o n of t h e pro cess








F i r m i ’ sm ac hine ha s the fo l lo wing
com pon e n ts:








































, a ssigning a quan tit yt o e ac h state s
i
;


































Ca l l the sta te c
i
the c ol lusiv e state o f ￿rm i ’s m ac hi ne; the sta t e m
j
i
the j -t h c om m u-
nic at i o n state of ￿rm i’ sm ac hi ne , and the sta te p
j
i
the j -th pun i shm en t s tate of ￿rm i ’s
m ac hine. The reas on fo r thi s term inolog y wi ll b ec om e cle ar be l o w.
Eac h ￿rm i’ sm ac hi ne induces a s e quence of states and a seque nce o f quan tit yc hoice s.















)], and s i m i larly for ￿rm 2 . He nce, the actual sta te s
t
i
re cursiv el y
sum m ariz es the " re lev an t" el em en ts of ￿rm i’s observ ed history . The qua n tit yt ob e





),i . e. it is based on the rel ev an te lem en ts of ￿ r m i ’s
obs e rv e dh i sto ry . In this sense, ￿rm i’ sm ac hine exe cutes i ts s trategy . I n princi ple,
m ac hines and thei r resulti ng s trategie s can b e v e ry c om pl ex ,c on ta i ning a larg e set of
p o ssible states, a nd s ophisti ca t ed quan ti t y a nd tra nsi tion functi o ns. I n practic e, ho w ev er,
so m er e s tri cti o ns on the ￿rm s’ m ac hi nes can b e im p osed. In thi s pa p er I expl ici tly im p ose
restri ctions on the m ac hi nes’ tra nsi tions fr om th e c ol lusiv e a nd th e c om m unic at i on sta te s.
1 0
See Osb orne and Rubinste i n (1994 ) for an o v er v iew.9
This ap proac hc an be v i ew e da saw a yo fm od e ll ing th e ￿rm s’ b ou nde dr a t i o nali t y .
Al ternativ el y ,i tm a yb ev i e w ed as a ￿ r s t ste pt o w a r d sab e tter understanding o f the
coll usion pro bl em wh e n not all ￿rm s’ a c tions a re obs e rv e d due to l o cali ze d com p etiti on .








trans i tions from the col lusiv e a nd com m unicati o n sta te s are no wr e s tri cte d as foll o ws :
T ran si tions from c
i
, for all i:
Fi rm i, i 6= 2:sta yi nc
i
u n l e ss





, in whic hc as e m o v et o m
i
i









Fi rm 2 : sta yi nc
2
unle ss





, i 6 =2 , i n whi c h case m o v et o m
i
2










,i n w h i c hc a s em o v et o m
2
2









T r a n s i t i o n s from m
j
i
, for all i; j :
Fi rm s 1 , 2 an d 3: sta yi n m
j
i









T hese trans i tions a re ill ustra te di n Figure 1. I n con tra st wit hm o del s of publi c infor-
m ation, a ￿rm i who i s in the c ol lusiv e state c a nnot a l w a ys im m edi at e ly m o v e to the
￿rst p uni sh m en t state p
1
i
a fte r one of the ￿rm s ha s devi at e d fro m i t s spe c i￿ed coll us i v e
quan ti t y . Thi si s o n l y p os si ble in case the dev iation o ccurre db y ￿rm 2, w ho i s publi cl y
obs e rv e d. In cas e ￿rm 1 o r ￿rm 3 de viated, a n in te rm edi a te com m unic at i o n s tate is
req uired.
11
A ￿rm w ho i s in the com m unication state re m ains i n this state un ti l￿ r m
2 has c hosen a quan ti t y di￿eren t from i ts coll usiv eq ua n ti t y q
c
2
, in whi c h ca se all ￿rm s
m o v e to the ￿rst punishm en t state.
1 1









, dep e ndi ng on
whet her ￿r m 1, ￿rm 3 or b o th de vi ate d.10
3 Prelim inary o b serv ations
3.1 O ne-sho t b est-re sp onse funct i on s
An i m p o rtan te l em e n t in the ana l ysis o f e quil ibria in b o th the one-s hot g am e a nd the in￿-
nite horiz on ga m ei s the deriv ati o n o f the ￿rm s’ o ne - shot b est-resp onse f un c tions . Giv en
































Due to the lo c al iz ed structure o f com p etiti on ￿rm i ’s b est-resp onse quan ti t y , i 6=2 , d o e s
o n ly dep end on ￿rm 2’s q ua n ti t y . Firm 2’s b est-resp o nse qua n tit y ,i nc o n tra st, dep ends
on b o th ￿rm 1’s a nd ￿rm 3 ’ sq ua n t it y .
Firm i an d ￿ r m 2’ s sim ul ta neous, or b ilate r al, one-sho t b est- re sp ons e q ua n ti tie s to the
third ￿rm j ’s q ua n ti t y q
j

















































, j 6 = i; 2:
(3)
Finall y , ￿rm 1, ￿rm 2 and ￿rm 3’s tri l ater al one-sho t b est-resp onse q ua n ti tie st o e ac h































2 ￿ + ￿
, fo r eac h i : (4)






) i s s i m ply the uni que C ourno t-N as h e quil ibrium for the on e -s hot
ga m e. Notic e tha t this so l ution i s sym m etri c in the presen tm o del .
12
3.2 N ec essa ry equi l i br i um cond i t ions
In the one-s hot g am e a n a ppropriate so l ution co nc ept is the Co urnot- N as h e q ui li brium .
In the in￿nit e horiz o n ga m ew i th pri v at e i nfo rm at i o n dev el ope d abo v e , an approp ri ate
1 2
The i n tuiti on f or the sym m et r y bet w ee n ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 3 i s s trai gh tfo rw a rd . The addi ti onal
sym m e try with ￿r m 2 fol lo ws from a n exact ba lance of t w o force s. On the one ha nd , ￿rm 2 ha s a hig he r
"i n tr i ns i c " dem and, induc i ng i t to s et hig h er quan ti ties . O n th e o t her hand, ￿r m 2 has t w oc o m p e titors
inste a do f j u s to ne , inducing i tt os e tl o w er quan ti ti es .11
re￿nem en t is the concept o f p erfec tB a y e si an e q ui li brium [F uden b erg and Tirol e (199 1)].
This so l ution con c ept req uires a cons i sten ts p e ci ￿c at i o n of ￿rm 1 an d 3’s b el iefs ab out
eac h o the rs ’ history ,a t e v e ry p eri od t afte re v ery observ ed history . A sp ec i￿cation of
b eli efs is co nsi st e n t if it can b e deri v e d from the strateg i es us i ng Ba y es’ rul ew h e nev er
p o ssible . Th e foll o wi ng s i m pl e sp eci ￿ca ti on o f b e li efs is co nsi st e n t wit h the strategies in
this pap e r, a nd wil lh e nc eforth b e used: at eac hp e rio d t af ter ev ery o bserv ed hi s tory ,
￿rm 1 (￿rm 3) b el ie v e s tha t ￿rm 3 (￿rm 1) has c h osen the quan ti t y prescri be d b y its
eq u i li brium strategy .
1 3
A p erfec tB a y esian e quil ibri um then results if no ￿ rm ha s a n i nc en ti v e to dev iate from
its stra te gy i na n y state, giv en the o the r ￿rm s ’ s trategi es and g i v e ni ts c o nsisten tb e l ie fs .





descri be d abo v e , a nd using w
i
to deno t e ￿rm i ’s




i sa l r e a d y p o s s ible to ob tai n the ￿rm s ’ no- dev iation constra i n ts i n the c ol lusiv e state and
in the c om m uni cation states. Call the s e con strain ts bri e￿y the c ol lusion a nd com m uni-
cation constra i n ts. Th e se constra i n ts a r e nec ess ary for all punishm en ts con si dered i n this
pap er. Observ ation 1 sho w s tha t the c ol lusion and the com m un i cation c o nstrain t s can
hold on l yi f the ￿rm sc ho ose thei ro n e - shot b e st -r e spo ns e q u an tit y in the com m un i cation
sta te . Mo re p re ci se ly:





describ ed a b o v e , a p erfe ct
















































PR OOF : See App endi x.




in its com m unic at i o n state, b ec a use th e n ￿rm i , i 6=2 , w ou l d alw a ys ha v ea ni ncen ti v e
1 3






). Supp os e ￿r st that ￿rm 1
did n o t obse rv eap e r i od t ￿ 1d e f e ction b y ￿rm 2 from its e qui li br i um strate g y . It can then us e Ba y es ’
rule to i nfer t ha t￿ r m 3 ’ s p e rio d t ￿ 1 quan ti t yc hoice w as acc o rd i ng to i ts e qui li br i um strate g y . Supp o se
ne x tt h a t￿ r m 1d i d obse rv e a p erio d t ￿ 1d e f e ction b y ￿rm 2 from its e qui li br i um strate gy . It can
the n ha v ea n y b eli e f ab out ￿r m 3 ’ s per i od t ￿ 1q ua n tit y cho i c e. S pe ci fy t hes e b eli ef ss u c ht h a t ￿rm 1
bel iev es ￿rm 3 did not de f e c ti np e r i od t ￿ 1 .A s i m i lar sp e ci￿cation of b eli e fs appl ies t o ￿rm 3.12
to devi a te in its coll us i v e sta te (as this devi ation w ou l d nev er b e "com m unic at e d "). N ext,
giv en th at ￿rm 2 c ho o ses a quan ti t y di￿ere n tf ro m q
c
2
in th e c om m uni cation states, all
￿rm si nt h e ir com m unication s tates exp ect the punishm en t state to o btain indep enden to f
t h e i r s p e ci￿c qua n tit yc ho i ce, so tha t th e on e - shot b e st- re s p ons e qua n tit yc ho i ce re m ains
the s i ng l e can di da te eq uili brium quan tit yc hoice i n the com m un i cation state. It is no w
p o ssible to w ri te the c ol lusion an d c om m uni cation con strain ts as fo l lo ws, a fte rs o m e
rearrang em en ts.
Co l lusion con strain ts for ￿rm 1 , 2 a nd 3:
c
i





































































































































































Th e s e cons train ts are i ncom ple te in the se ns e t ha t t h e c on ti n uation pro ￿t w
i
at the
star t of t h e ￿rst pun i shm en ts t a te is not y e t determ ined. The n e xt sec tion cons i ders
alternativ e, p erfec tB a y e si a n punishm en ts to calc ul ate w
i
.N ev erthel ess, i ti s instructi v e
to already h a v ea ￿ r s t lo ok a t th e col lusion an d com m unication c o nstrain ts. Only ￿ r m
2’s co l lusion cons train ti s standa rd from th e p erf ect publi c inform ation m o del s . It sa ys
that the (norm ali zed) presen tv alue from co l ludi n g fo re v e r should b e at l eas t as high as
the p ro￿t from (o pti m all y) dev iating once and then g oing to the ￿ rst p uni sh m en t s tate.
The o the rc o nstrain ts di￿er from the pub l ic i nfo r m at ion m o del s.
First, co nsi de r ￿rm i ’s collusi o n cons trai n t, i 6= 2 . Firm i re al ize s that, after devi at i ng ,
there is an in te rm edi a te com m unication sta te b e fo re the ￿rst punishm en t sta te . A prior i
it is no t cl ea r ho w thi si n t erm e di ate c om m uni cation sta t e a￿ects ￿rm i ’s c ol lusion c on -
stra i n t. D e p endi ng o n the s e v e rit yo f t h e punishm e n t, it turns o ut tha t the in t erm e di ate
com m unic at i o n state m a ye ither relax o r t igh ten ￿rm i’ s, i 6 =2 c ol lusion constra i n t, as
com pared to the publi c inform ation m od e ls.
Second, consider ￿rm 2’s com m unicati o n constra i n ts. T he s e p oten ti al ly bi nd i ng c on -
stra i n ts are not prese n ti np u b l ic inform ation m o dels. T ak e ￿rm 2 ’ s com m un i cation
1 4










trivi all y satis￿e d.13
constra i n ti n state m
1
2
,i . e. when ￿ r m2 i s supp osed to c om m uni cate a d e viati on b y￿ r m
1 t o ￿ r m 3. This c o nstrain ts a ys that ￿rm 2’s (norm ali ze d ) pro￿ t from com m un i cating
once an d then go i ng to the ￿rs t punishm en t sta te s hould b e a t l ea st as hi g h as the prese n t
v alue of the pa y o￿ from ne ve r com m unicating ￿rm 1 ’ sd e fec tion to ￿rm 3, a nd henc e
at l east k ee pi ng coll usion wi th ￿rm 3. A s i m i lar i n tui tion holds fo r 2’s com m un i cation




Th e c ol lusion c o nstra i n ts are m ore li k e ly to b e satis￿ed th e l o w er the w
i
,i . e. the m ore
sev ere the pun i shm en t s . The sta ndard li terature on pu bl ic inform ation ha s em ph asiz ed
one b ound on th e sev erit y of the puni sh m en ts: the punishm en t s hould not b e so se v e re
that ￿rm sh a v ea ni n c en ti v e to devi a te from the ir strategy i na n y of thei r punishm e n t
sta te s. The presen tm o del with pri v at e i nfo rm at i o n iden ti￿es a new p o te n tial b o und
on the sev erit y o f the p uni sh m en t: the p uni sh m en t sho ul d no t b e so sev ere that ￿rm 2
has a n inc en ti v e not to c om m uni cate a priv atel y observ ed de viation. F rom (??), i f the
punishm e n ti s to o sev ere (i. e. w
2
is t oo l o w), ￿rm 2 m a y pref er n ot to com m unic at e a
d e v i a t i o n b y on e o f the other ￿rm si n order to a t l eas t c on t in ue to coll ude with the other
￿rm , who did no t o bserv e the devi at i on . Thi s dem onstra te s the ev en g re at e ri m p or-
tance of appro pri at e ly c hosen punishm en ts w he n there is priv ate inform ation. S e cti on 4
d i s c u s s e s al t ernativ e punishm en ts i n greater detail .
3.3 Sym m e tri cc ol l usi o n, sym m e tri c punishm en ts
In the in￿nite ho ri zon g am em an y outcom es di￿ere n t from the static C ourno t o ut-
com em a yg e ne ra l ly b e sus tainable a s a p erfec tB ay esi an e quil ibri um . A tten ti on is
restri cted he re to the set of sy mmet r ic c ol lu s iv e outcom es, de￿ned as the set o f sym -






) that g i v ea l l ￿rm s stri ctly g re a ter pro￿ts tha n the Courn ot-
Nash p ro￿ts. Th i sr e stricti on c an b e de fended as foll o ws . A si se a sil y seen, for all





( q; q; q ) = 2=￿
3







) deriv ed ab o v e is sym m etri c. Cons e quen tl y ,i n the pre se n tm o del a n y






) in the in￿ni te horiz on ga m e inc rea se s the ￿rm s’
pro￿ ts prop ortiona l ly , a prop e rt y freq uen tl yi m po se di n the l ite ra ture .
15
1 5
F ri ed m an and Thisse (19 93), for exam pl e , de ￿ne the coll us i v es o lutio n as the P are to-o pt i m a l soluti on
that yi el ds pro￿ts that are in the s a m e prop ort i on as i n the o ne -shot equil ibrium .S e e a l so Sc hm al e nse e14
Th e join t-pr o￿t maximizing outcom e, i .e . the outcom e that m axi m iz es the sum of the








2(￿ + ￿ )
, fo r e ac h i : (7)






)i s s y m m et ric, it i sa n e l em e n t
of the s e to fs y m m etri cc ol lusiv e outcom e s. F urtherm or e , i t i sa l s oaP areto- optim al
o u t co m e. T he s e fa c ts m ak e the join t-pro￿t m ax im i zi ng so l ution a pa rt icul ar l y a ttr a cti v e
candidate equi li brium outcom e. Theref or e m o st o f the atten tion wi ll b e fo c us e d on the







A tten ti o n is further restri cted to sy mmet r ic punishm e n ts, de￿ne d as punishm e n ts






















. Giv en sym m etri c coll us i v e
outco m es, sym m etri cp u n i sh m en ts reduce all ￿rm s ’ pro￿ts prop ortionally after a publi cl y
obs e rv e d dev iation. T hi s generali ze s Abre u’s (1 98 6) no ti on o f sy m m e tric punishm e n ts.
It i s no w p o ssible to m ak e the fo l lo wing o bser v ati on , d e term i ning wh i c h of the c ol lusion
and com m unic at i o n constra i n ts is n on bi nd i ng .
OB S ER V A TION 2. Giv en a sym m etri cc o l lusiv e outcom e a nd a sym m etri cp u n i sh m en t,
￿rm 1 and 3 ’ sc ol lusion con strain ts coi nc ide. M or e o v e r, ￿ r m2 ’ sc om m uni ca t ion c on -
stra i n ti nm
1
2
an d i n m
3
2















￿ 0; otherwise, ￿rm 2 ’ s col lusion c o nstra i n ti sn o n bi nd i ng .















































































































Using o bserv ati o n 2, it su￿c es to consider only (i) ei ther ￿rm 1 o r ￿rm 2 ’ sc ol lusion














, (ii ) ￿rm 2 ’ s ￿rst com m uni-
cation constra i n t, and (ii i) the no-devi at i on c o nstrain ts i n th e punishm en ts states, or
(198 7) for a gene ral disc uss i on of Pa r eto-opti m al s o lutio ns that are no t nec ess ari ly i nc onsiste n tw i th t he
coll us i v es o lutio n de ￿ned he re .15
sho rtl y , the pu ni sh m en t cons trai n ts. These punishm en tc o nstra i n ts are deri v ed b e lo w
for al terna ti v ep u n i sh m en ts, c om pleti ng the descri ption of the stra te gi es.
4 Alternativ e punis hm en ts
I consi der t w o classes of (sym m etri c) punishm e n ts: g ri m punishm e n ts and stic k-a nd-
carrot puni sh m en ts. These punishm en ts are rel at i v e ly sim ple, and the ya l lo wf o ra c lose
com parison wi th e xisting results.
4.1 Gri mp u n i shm en ts
Fi rs t c o nside r in ￿n ite gr i m punishm e n ts, as in F ri edm an (1 971 ). These are de ￿n e da s






￿rm i pro duce s its
Co urnot-Nas h quan ti t y q
T
.T ransiti o ns fro m p
1
i
are v ery sim ple: once in p
1
i
, ￿rm sa l w a ys




With i n￿niteg r i m pun i shm en t s , the pu ni shm en t constra i n ts are trivi al ly sa ti s￿ e d for
eac h ￿rm i, g i v e n that i ts ri v al s pro duce thei r C ourno t-N as h q ua n t it y .N e cessary and
su￿ci en t c o ndi tions fo r a p erfec tB a y esian eq ui li brium a re th e n ￿rm 2’s ￿rst com m uni-



















)=2 . Usi n g the join t pro ￿t m ax i-
m i zi n g outcom e as the c ol lusiv e solution, stra i gh tfo r w ar d c al culations
16
sho w tha t ￿ r m
1’s coll us i o n constra i n ti s satis￿ed if and o nl yi f￿￿ ￿
1
g
; ￿ r m 2 ’ sc ol lusion cons train ti s
s a ti s￿ed i f and on l yi f￿ ￿ ￿
2
g
; a nd ￿rm 2’s com m un i cation c o nstrain t is satis￿ed i f and





i s the l a rgest so l ution to qua drati c

































(2 + ￿ )
2
(2 + ￿ )
2




(2 + ￿ )
2
(2 + ￿ )
2
+ ￿ (4 + ￿ )(8 ￿ ￿
2




The cal cu l ations fol lo w from subst i tuting the pa y o ￿ s giv e n in t he A pp endix in the v ari ous con-
st rai n ts. Th ey a re a v ai labl ef ro m the author on re q ue st.16
and where ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ i s the substituti o n pa ram e ter. W hi c h of these cons train ts i s actuall y
bindi ng , tu rns out to dep end c ruci al ly o n whethe r the g o o ds a re subs ti tutes, ￿> 0, or
com pl em e n ts, ￿< 0. A pp l ying ob se rv at i o n 2, it turns out tha t ￿ ￿ ￿
1
g
is irre lev an t for
￿ > 0 , a nd tha t ￿ ￿ ￿
2
g
is irrel ev an t for ￿< 0. F urtherm or e , ￿
g
> 1 f o r ￿ < 0, and
￿
g











f or ￿ > 0. T he e ar l ie r ￿ndi ng s t he ny iel d:
PR OPOSI TI ON 1. S upp o se ￿rm s use i n￿n i te grim puni sh m en ts. (i) I f ￿> 0, t he j oi n t-
pro￿ t m axim izi ng o utcom e is susta i na bl ea sap e r f ect B a y e sian equi libri um i f and o nl y





(ii )I f￿< 0 , the join t- pro￿t m axi m i zing so l ution is susta i na bl ei f and o nl yi f￿2[ ￿
g
; 1] .
P r opos i tion 1 i si llustrated o n Figure 2 , plotting the rang e of feas i ble disc ou n t factors ,






, a nd ￿
g
, as a func tion o f the subs ti tution
para m eter ￿ .I t i s stra i gh tforw ar d t o sh o w that @￿
1
g
= @ ￿ < 0 f or ￿< 0, @￿
2
g
= @ ￿ > 0 f or
￿ > 0, and @ ￿
g
=@ ￿ < 0 for ￿ > 0 ,a sd r a wn. This s ho ws that, when ￿rm s use in￿ni te
grim p uni sh m en ts, the j oi n t-pro ￿t m ax i m i zing so l ution is m ost li k e ly to b e susta i na bl e
when g o o ds are v ery inde p ende n t, i. e. ￿ cl os e to zero. The m ore the g o o ds b ec om e
c om pl em e n ts o r substitutes, the sm all er the rang e o f di sco un tf a c to rs for whic h the
join t-pro￿t m ax im i zi ng so l ution i s susta i na bl e.
Th e s e ￿ndi ng s m a yb ec om pa re d with the h yp othetic al c as e i n whic h there w ould
be p e rfect publ ic i nfo rm at i o n. In this cas e o nl y ￿rm 2’s coll us i o n constra i n tw ould b e
rel ev an t,
1 7
s o that the jo i n t-pro ￿t m axi m i zing o utc om ew ou l d b e susta i na bl e if and o nl y
if ￿ ￿ ￿
2
g
. Th i s turns out t ob e e xa c tly the sa m e co ndi tion as de riv ed b yD e nec k e re
(19 83 ) ,i na r e lated m o del wi th out l o cali zed com p eti tion.
1 8
The ana l ysis then stresses
that wh e n there is pri v a te inform ation due to l o cali zed c om pe titi o n and when go o ds
are s ubstit ut e s, ￿> 0, t he re exi s t sab i nding upp er b oun d on the di sc ou n t factor, ￿
g
,
ab o v e whic h th e jo i n t-pro ￿t m ax i m i zi n g ou tc om e is not sustainab l e, i n additi o n to the
1 7
T o see th i s, note th a t when the re i s public i nform ation, no i n t erm ediate com m unicatio n state is
re qui re d in case ￿rm 1 or ￿r m 3 deviated; ￿r m s can the n i m m ed i ate l ym o v e to t he ￿rs t punishm en t
st a te . Firm 1 and 3’ sc o ll us i on c onstrain tc o ns eque n tl yw ould coincide wi th ￿rm 2’ s coll us i on c o ns train t,
and ￿rm 2’s com m unicatio n c onstrain ts w oul db e a bs en t.
1 8
The re sults on pro duc t di ￿e re n ti atio n and c o ll us i on di￿er whe n ￿rm s se t price s rather than q uan-
titi e s. Se e Dene c k ere (19 83), Chang (19 91) and R oss (1 992).17
sta ndard l o w er b o und fro m th e p ubl ic i nfo rm at i on m ode l. The upp e r b oun d arises from
￿rm 2’s ince n tiv e pro bl em to co m m un i cate priv atel y o bserv ed devi at i on s b y ￿rm 1 or
￿rm 3. If ￿rm 2 i sv ery patie n t, the ni t prefers to co n tin ue to col lude with ev en just
one ￿rm , r a ther t h a nt oc o m m un i cate and then to b e p uni sh e d. This sug gests that the
in￿ni te gri m punishm e n tm a ys o m e tim e sb eto o sev er e , rather tha n insu￿ci en tl ys e v e re
as a rgued i n the li terature on publi ci nfo rm at i o n [e. g. A breu (198 6)]. The question no w
arises whether th e upp e r b ound m a y b e relaxe di f￿ r m sf ol lo w alternativ e, le ss se v e re
punishm e n ts.
19
Co nsider the refore the fo l lo wing le s s sev ere punishm en ts : ￿ni te g ri m punishm en ts .
These puni sh m en ts sp eci fy J punishm e n t states, i .e. fp
1
i
; :: :; p
J
i
g for eac h ￿rm i. In
eac h sta t e p
j
i
￿rm i pro duce s its C ournot- N a sh qua n tit y q
T




j =1 ;: :: ;J ￿ 1 , is alw a y st o p
j +1
i





. In other w ords, after a
devi ation b y ￿rm2 , e ac h ￿rm i rev erts to the Cou rnot quan tit y fo r only a ￿ nite n um be r
of p eri o ds, J , a nd then g o e s bac kt o the coll us i v e s tate.
20
Th e punishm en t cons trai n ts in all sta te s p
j
1
, j = 1; :: :; J are tri viall y satis￿ed for
eac h ￿rm i, giv en that its riv als pro duce their Courno t quan ti t y . Nec essa ry and
su￿ci en tc o nditi o ns for a p e rfect B a y e si an e quil ibrium are then the c ol lusion and

























)]. Cle a rl y ,a sJ !1 the c as e of i n￿n i te gri m
punishm e n ts obta i ns; a s J decr ea se s , the punishm en tp a y o￿ incre as e s an d henc e the
punishm e n t b ecom e s less sev ere . This generates a great deal o f ￿exi bil it y on the punish-
m e n ts.
Figure 3 pl o ts the rang e o f discoun t factors that sus tain the join t- pro￿t m axi m i zing
outco m e fo r alte rn ati v e punishm e n tl engths , J !1 , J =5 0 a n d J = 1 0. A sc o uld b e
1 9
An al te rnativ ew a yt or e l ax the upp e r b ound m a ys e e m t ob e t oi nc rease ￿rm 2’ s pro￿t from
com m unicating. Noti ce h o w ev er t ha t￿ r m 2i sa l re ady pr o ducing a one-s ho t b es t-res p onse s trategy
aga inst th e other ￿rm s. He nce , the only w a yt oi nc rease ￿rm 2’ sc o m m uni ca ti on pro￿t is b yc hangi ng
￿rm i, i 6= 2 quan ti t y when it is i n the c om m uni ca ti on state. By o b ser v atio n1 ,h o w ev e r, this i s not
p oss i ble.
2 0
Noti c e that ￿ ni te gri m punishm en ts can b e cons i de rabl ym ore "c o m plex" than i n ￿ni te gri m pun-
ishm en ts i n the se nse that the ￿rm s’ m ac hines nee d J state s to e x e cut e the punishm en t rathe r than
just one state u nder in￿nite grim pu ni sh m en ts. Co ns eque n tl y ,￿ r m s who are b ounde dl y ratio na li nt h e
se nse that t heir m a chi ne s can onl y pro ce ss a sm al ln um be r o f s tates , m a y not b e able to e xec ute thes e
st rategi e s for l arge J .18
ex pe c ted, reduci n g the pun i shm en tl e n gth, a nd th u s softeni ng the punishm en t, has t w o
e￿ec ts : the c ol lusion co nstrain ti st igh tened and the co m m un i cation con strain ti s relaxe d.
F or high discoun t factors, the collusi on c o nstra i n ti sn o n bi nding a nd the com m un i cation
constra i n ti sb i nding, so that a reducti o n o f the punishm e n t length i si n fact app ropriate.
The que st i on a ri ses whether i ti sp o s s i bl et ov ary the punishm en tl e ng th suc h tha t the
join t-pro￿t m axi m iz ing o utc om e b ecom e s s ustainable fo r al l di scou n t factors a b o v e ￿
g
.
The fo l lo wi ng p r opo si tion e sta bl ishes t h at this is indee d the c a se.
PR OPOSI TI O N 2. Th e re a re grim punishm e n ts, ￿nite or i n￿nite, suc h tha t the jo i n t-
pro￿ t m axi m iz ing outcom e is susta i na bl e as a p erfec tB a y esi a n equi libri um f or ￿ 2 [ ￿
g
; 1].
PR OOF .I f￿< 0 , then J !1 supp orts c ol lusion for an y ￿ 2 [￿
g
; 1] b y prop o siti on 1.




] b y pro p os i tion 1 . No w co nsi der
J = 2. Stra i gh tfo rw ard algebra using the c ol lusion an d co m m un i cation cons t ra i n ts (??)
and (??) w i th the appro pri a te substitutions sho ws that a gri m puni sh m en t with length
J = 2 supp orts c ol lusion if ￿ 2 [￿
￿
g


















F urtherm or e , for ￿> 0, @￿
￿
g
=@ ￿ > 0, @ ￿
g
=@ ￿ < 0; a n d at ￿ =1 , ￿
￿
g
=: 67 3 < ￿
g
= : 69 8.













o v e r l ap so that the rang e [￿
g
; 1] is c o v e red b ye ither in￿nite grim punishm e n ts or gri m
punishm e n ts wi th l eng t h J = 2. This su￿ce st o s h o w t h e p r opos i tion. 2
P r opos i tion 2 sho ws that le ss se ve r e p uni sh m en ts tha n in￿nite grim punishm e n ts m a y
so m eti m es b e ne cessa ry , when s om e o f the ￿rm s ’ devi ations a re no t p ubl icl y observ ed
due to lo c al iz ed com p etiti on . T hi s con tra sts with the l ite ra ture on publi c inform ation
[A breu(19 86)], whic h cri tici ze s in￿nite pu ni sh m en ts as b e ing no t s u￿ cie n tl y sev ere. A
surprising part in the pro o f of prop ositi o n 2 is tha t, in the p re sen tm od e l, a v ery soft
punishm e n t, with le ng th J =2 ,a l ready su￿ce st o c o v er the w hole ra nge of discoun t fac-
tors a b o v e ￿
g
.T h i si m plie s tha t th e stra t eg i es do no t a c tua l ly need to b e to o "com pl ex"
(in the sense o f req uiri n g a large n um b er of s tates) in o rde r to s ustain coll us i o n when
the discoun t factor i sh i gh .19
4.2 Sti c k- a nd-carr ot puni sh m en ts
The prev ious subsecti on e st a bli shed tha t a ppropriate punishm e n ts can b e f o und suc h that
the join t-pro￿t m ax im i zi ng ou t c om e is s ustainab l e for ￿ ￿ ￿
g
.D o t he re exi st punishm e n ts
suc h that thi s outcom ei s susta i na bl e for som ed i sc ou n t factors b e low ￿
g
? This requi res
rel ax ing the c ol lusion c o nstrain t s (??), w hi c h sho ul d b ed o n eb ym ak ing the punishm e n ts
mor e sev er e than the i n￿nite grim punishm e n ts con si dered a b o v e. T o ￿ nd the true lo w er
b o und o n the discoun t factor, the m os t sev ere c redibl e punishm en ts sho ul d b e found .
In a p e rfect publ ic i nfo rm at i on m o del Abreu (19 86) h as sh o wn that the m ost se v e re
punishm e n ts, w i thin the c lass of sym m etri cp u n i sh m en ts, tak e the sim ple form o f stic k-
and -carrot punishm en ts: a v e ry sev ere o ne - p eri o d punishm en t after whic h coll usion is
restored. I n Abreu’ sp u b l ic inform ation m o del, the sev eri t y of the p uni sh m en ti s l i m i ted
so l el yb ya s i m ple no-devi at i o n constra i n t in the punishm e n ts t a te. In the presen tm o del
with pri v a te inform ation the sev eri t y of the pu ni sh m en tm a y b e further lim ite d du e to the
com m unic at i o n problem sd i scuss e d abo v e .I n o wi n v estiga te ho w the s e com m un i cation
prob l em s pre cisel yi n￿ ue nce the se v e rit y o f the pu ni sh m en t, and corresp ondingly the
lo w er b o und on the di scou n t factor. T oa v oid c om plic at i o ns I restri ct atten t ion to the
case i n whic h go o ds are substitute s, i . e. ￿> 0.
21
Thi s cas e is al s o the m ost freq uen tl y
ana l yzed case in the li terature on col lusion.
22
In the presen tm od e l with priv ate i nfo rm at i on du e t o l o c al iz ed com p eti tion, stic k-a nd-
carrot punishm e n ts m a y b e de￿ned as foll o ws . F o r eac h ￿rm i,t h e re is o ne punishm e n t
sta te , p
1
i








)y e t to b e dete rm i ned. T ransitions from the punishm e n t sta te a re a nalogo us
to transiti o ns fro m th e co l lusiv e state a s descri be d a bo v e:






















In the alter na tiv ec a s e in whi ch g ood s a re co m pl em en ts c orner sol utions whe re the punishm en t
quan ti ties a r e ze ro, m a y arise .
2 2
Iw i ll al s o ass um e here that ￿rm s op erate a t a su￿cien tly l arge m argi nal c ost ￿> c> 0. Thi sr u l es
out c ases in whic h the punishm en t quan ti ties caus e p ri c e st o b en e g ativ e. In this s ec ti on, t he param ete r





, i 6=2 , i nw h i c h case m o v et o m
i
2



















In con trast t o Abre u’s m od e l with publi c inform ation, e ac h ￿rm i who i si n the
punishm e n t s tate p
1
i




i n the ev en t one of the ￿rm sw ould h a v e devi at e d from the pu ni sh m en t quan tit y q
p
.
This is o nl y p ossible i n cas e th e devi at i on o c curred b y ￿rm 2, who i s publ icl yo b s e rv e d.
In case ￿rm 1 or ￿ r m 3 devi ated, an i n term ediate com m unic at i o n sta te i sr e quire d.
T o dete rm i ne the punishm e n t quan ti t y q
p
i n th e stic k-a nd-carrot pu ni sh m en t, note
that ￿rm i ’s (no rm al iz ed) con ti n ua t ion pro ￿t at the start of the punishm e n t state, w
i
,i s














































, i 6 = 2
w
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The punishm en t quan tit y q
p
in the stic k-and- c a rrot punishm en t is then dete rm ine da s
f oll o ws : q
p
m i ni m i zes t h e punishm e n tp a y o ￿ (??) s ub je ct t o a ll no-devi at i o n con strain ts .
Th e fo l lo wing ob se rv at i on i s useful to dete rm i ne whic h of the puni sh m en t constra i n ts
is no n binding.
OB SE R V A TION 3 . Giv e nas y m m e tric c ol lusiv e outcom e and sym m etric stic k-a nd-
carrot puni sh m en ts, ￿rm 1 a nd 3 ’ s puni sh m en t constra i n ts co i nci de .F urtherm or e ,￿ r m














￿ 0; ot h e rw i se
￿rm 2’s pu ni sh m en t constra i n ti sn o n binding.

























































F rom o bserv ati o n 2 and 3 , it su￿ce s to cons i der only (i ) ￿rm 2 ’ s ￿rst com m unic a-
tion c o nstrain t, and (i i) eithe r ￿rm 1 ’ s coll usion an d pun i shm en t constra i n ts or ￿rm 2’s
















In con trast to grim punishm en ts , the se c o n strain t s are not trivi all y satis￿e d.21
It i s straigh tforw ard to sho w tha t, fo r ￿> 0, q
p
i s the lar g est qua n tit y tha t solv es
eit h e r ￿r m 1’s pun i shm en t co nstrain t in (??), or ￿rm 2’s punishm e n t cons t ra i n t (??), or
￿rm 2 ’ sc o m m un i cation constra i n t (??) as an equali t yw i tho ut violating an yo f t h e other




a n d~ q
p
.
If the re w ould b e p ubl ic inform ation, as in Abreu’ sm o del ,i tw ould b e e as y t o de ter-
m i ne q
p
b ec a use com m unication c o nstrain t (??) w ould b e ab se n t and b ecause ￿rm 1’s
punishm e n t constra i n ti n (??) w ould coinci de with ￿rm 2’s punishm e n tc o nstrain t. Un-
der publi c inform ation q
p
i s then the l a rgest s ol ut i on to ￿rm 2 ’ s punishm e n t cons tr ai n t










￿ + ￿ ￿
q
￿ ( ￿ + ￿ ) ￿
2 ￿ + ￿ ￿ 2
q




C al l the s ti c k-a nd-carro t puni sh m en t using this quan ti t y￿ q
p
t he standar d stic k-and -c a rrot




the m o di￿e d stic k-
and -carrot puni sh m en ts. Unde r publi c inform ation i t h as b ee n sho wn that the stan dard
stic k-an d-carrot puni sh m en t is the m o st sev ere punishm en ti n the cl a s so fs y m m etri c
punishm e n ts.
24
It is there fo re also the optim a l sym m etri c puni sh m en t u nde r publi c
inform ati o n. The c o rre spon d i ng lo w e r b o und on the discoun tf ac to r is found from ￿ r m
2’s collusi o n cons trai n t (??), a fte r s ubstituti ng w
2








(2 + ￿ )
2
16 (1 + ￿ )
whic h i s alw a ys b el o w the grim punishm e n tl o w e r b oun d ￿
g
, a s could be e xp ecte d.
T he ￿ rst que st i o n is whether the stand ard sti c k-and- c a rrot punishm e n t, b ei ng the
m ost sev ere and henc e optim al pu ni sh m en to f t h e publi c inform ati on m o del ,i ss t ill
feasibl e in th e priv ate i nfo rm at i on m o del , or whethe r, to the c on tra ry , the com m un i cation
prob l em sm ak e this pu ni shm en t infe a sibl e. This q ue stion is a nsw ere di n the fo l lo wing
prop os i tion:
PR OPOSI TI ON 3. Cons i der ￿> 0. When ￿rm s use the standa rd stic k-and -c a rrot




, the jo i n t-pro ￿t m axi m iz ing outcom ei s no t susta i na bl ea s
a p erfe ct Ba y esian equi libri um .
PR OOF : See App endi x.
2 4
Thi sw as s ho wn b y Abre u f or the case i n whic h ￿ =1 ; i t i m m edia t ely ge nerali ze s t o ￿< 1 .22
The in tuition for P rop o siti o n3i ss i m pl e: the standa rd stic k-a nd-carrot p uni sh m en t, in
whic h ￿rm s pro duce the punishm e n tq ua n tit y￿ q
p
o f t h e p ub l ic i nfo rm at i on m ode l, i st o o
sev ere. F or all ￿ 2 (0 ; 1 ] ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 3 do not ha v ea ni ncen tiv et oc a rry o ut the
punishm e n t, b ecaus e b yd e viating from the punishm e n ta ni n te rm edi a te com m un i cation
p erio d o ccurs
2 5
be fo re they are puni sh e d fo r the ir dev iation. F urtherm or e ,f or m os t ￿,i .e.
￿ 2 (0 ; 0:795 ] ￿rm 2 do e s not ha v ea ni ncen tiv e to com m unicate a devi ation b y ￿ r m 1o r3
from their prescri be dc ol lusiv e o r punishm e n t qua n tit y ,b e c a use ￿rm 2 prefe rs to at least
coll ude with the n ondevi ating ￿ rm rath e r tha n e ng ag i ng i n a o ne-p erio d com m un i cation
sta te a nd a v ery sev ere punishm e n t a fte rw a rds.




, c a n n ot sustain
the jo i n t-pro ￿t m axim iz ing o utc om e under priv ate inform ation, the next questi o n is for









, s ustain th e join t- pro￿t m ax im i zi ng o utc om e. T o a nsw e r this question, l et the
v alue of the disc ou n t factor for w hi c h ￿rm 1’s c ol lusion co nstrain t (??) is jus t sa t is￿ed
















. W e then h a v e:
PR OPOSI TI ON 4. C onsider ￿> 0 a nd supp os e ￿rm s use m o di￿ed stic k-and -c a rrot
punishm e n ts. (i )F or ￿ 2 (0; 0 : 1 17], the joi n t-p r o￿ t m axi m i zing o utc om e is susta i na bl e













(ii ) F or ￿ 2 (0 : 11 7; 1], the join t- pro￿t m axi m i zing outcom ei s sus tainable a s a p erfe ct













PR OOF : See App endi x.
In tui tiv el y , for ￿ 2 (0 ; 0:117 ] , ￿rm s pro duce ^ q
p
, the larg e st quan tit y suc h tha t ￿ r m







.F or ￿ 2 (0:11 7; 1], ￿rm s pro duc e~ q
p
, the larg e st q ua n ti t y suc h that ￿ r m







In o the rw ords , for ￿ 2 (0 ; 0:117 ] the ￿rm s are c o nstrained b y ￿rm 1 and 3 ’ s punishm e n t
constra i n t; for (0:117 ; 1] th e ￿rm s are co nstrained b y ￿rm 2’s com m unic at i on c o nstrain t.
Note that, f or ￿ 2 (0; 0 : 1 17], ~ q
p
i sm o re sev ere t ha n ^ q
p
, but this w ou l dv iolate ￿rm 1’s
2 5
The p a y o￿ in this c om m uni c ati on p erio d is larger tha n the punishm en t, in c o n tr a s t with the c a se
of grim punishm en ts a nd ￿> 0.23




in this ran ge of ￿ .
F urtherm or e ,f o r￿2 (0: 11 7; 1] ,^ q
p
is m ore sev ere than ~ q
p
, but this w ou l dv iolate ei ther
￿rm 1’ sc o l lusion c o nstra i n to r￿ r m 2 ’ s com m unication c o nstra i n tf or a n y discoun t factor
in this rang e of ￿ .








a re m uc h be l o w ￿
g
, t he l o w er b o und w he n grim puni sh m en ts a re used. They are also ,
ho w ev er, m uc h abo v e ￿
s
, the lo w e r b o und when th e stan dard stic k-and- c a rrot punish-
m e n ts from the publi c inform ation c as e w ou l dh a v eb e en feas i ble . This the n dem o nstrates
that the com m unication proble m s due to the lo c al iz ed nature o f com p etiti on m a yb ea
s i g n i￿can t factor hi ndering coll us i on .
5 Multim ark et op e rat i on
T h e abo v em o del ana l yze d the sta bi li t yo f c ol lusion when there i s priv ate inform ation
due to l o cali zed com p eti tion. This s e cti o n rein terprets the m od e l in a n alternativ ew a y ,
a s a m o d e l o fm ulti m ark e to p e ra ti o n. This exe rcise is us e ful, b ecause a n ti trust p o l ic y
has o fte n b een con c erned w i th the p ossibil it yo fc ol lusion when ￿rm so p e ra te in sev e ra l
m ark ets.
Th e re i s a gro wing theoreti cal and em pi ric al l i terature on the re lations hi pb e t w e en
m ulti m ark et o p eration and collusi on .
2 6
F r o m a theoreti cal p ersp ecti v e ,B ernhei m and
Whinston (1 99 0) pro vi de the m os t s i gn i ￿can t con tri bution. T he y ana l yze mul timar ke t
c ontac t,a s i tua ti on i n wh i c ht w oo r m ore ￿rm sm e et e ac h other in s e v e ra l m ar k ets. T he y
sho w that m ul tim ark et con tact serv es to p o o l th e ￿ r m s’ inc en ti v ec o nstrain ts a nd i de n ti fy
conditi o ns under whic ht h i s p o oli ng stri ctly enha nc es the ￿rm s’ abil it yt o c ol lude. In
thei r concludi ng sec tion Be rnh e im a nd Whinston a sk whethe r thei r results w ould ex tend
to the al terna ti v es e tting o f mult im arke t op er ation a bsen tm ulti m ark et con tact, i .e. a
situation in whic h only o ne ￿rm op erates i ns e v e ra l m ark e ts , m ee ting s i ng l e-m ark et
com p eti to rs i n eac h of these m ar k ets. They q ue stion the p o ssibil it y that their results
wil li ndeed exte nd t o su c h a setti n g ,i np a r tb e c a use the si n gle -m ark et com p eti to rs m a y
not e v e n obs e rv e outcom e si n the m ar k ets w he re they do not o p erate.
2 6
See Be rnhe i m and Whi ns to n (19 90), v an Wittelo o s tuij n and v an W e gb erg (1992), B arl a (1993 ),
Ev ans and Kes sides (1994 ), G i m eno (19 94).24
In fact, a sim pl er e in te rpretation o f the m o del dev elop e d in this pap er all o ws to pro vi de
a fo rm a l ans w e r to this questi on . C on s i de rt w om ar k ets, A and B .I n eac hm ar k et k ,
































, i =0 ; 1 ; 2, i s the quan ti t y cons um ed of g o o d i i nm ar k et k . Assum e ￿> 0,
￿ > 0, ￿ 6 = 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . Go o d 0 is the outside go o d. I ne ac hm ark et k , g o ods 1
and 2 are sub sti tutes fo r ￿> 0 , they a re com ple m en t s for ￿< 0. The i n v e rse dem and
eq u ati o n sf o rg o o d1 a n d2i nm ark et k can b e deriv ed from solv ing th e represe n ta ti v e
consum er’ s uti lit ym axi m iz at i o n prob l em :
p
ik




, i =1 ; 2; j =1 ; 2; i 6 = j:
Co nsi d e r the fo l lo wing situation of m ultim ar k et op e ra ti o n abs e n tm ul tim ar k et c on tact.
There are thre e ￿rm s, ￿rm 1A , ￿rm 1B and ￿rm 2, com p eti ng i n qua n titi es fo r an in￿n te
n um b e ro fp e r i o ds, discoun ti ng t h e future a t a factor ￿ .F irm 1 A and 1B p ro duce the
quan ti t y o f goo d 1 i nm ar k et A a nd B , resp ecti v e ly .F irm 2 pro duce s the qua n tit yo f
g o o d 2 in b oth m ark e ts A and B .H ence there i sm ultim ar k et o p eration b y ￿rm 2, but
there is no m ulti m ark e t con ta c t: ￿rm 2 fa c es t w o di￿eren ts i ng l e-m ark e t com p etitors
in eac hm ark et. (Think o f a m ulti na ti o nal ￿rm fa c ing a dom e st i c ￿rm i nt w o di￿ere n t







































, i =1 ; 2 ; j =1 ; 2 :i 6= j (1 1)
Co nsi de rt h ef ol lo wing th r ee cases.
Ca se 1: Publi ci n form at ion on out com es in b ot hm ark et s.
In thi sc a se the thre e ￿rm s o bserv e the q ua n ti t yc ho i ce s of eac h ￿rm i n eac hm ark et, ev en
￿rm s 1 A an d 1B w h o ar e o nl y a cti v ei n on e of the m ark e ts. Con se quen tl y ,B ernhei m and
Whinston ’ s an aly sis ap pl ie s: ￿ r m 2’ s no -dev iation cons trai n ts can b e p o o l ed o v er the
t w om ark e ts . T hi s all ows ￿rm 2 to transfer p oss i ble slac ko n i ts no -dev iation constra i n ts
from one m ark et to th e o the r. In the pre se n tm o del B ernhei m and Whi ns ton’s i rrele v an c e25
result w ou l dh o l d: du e to the sym m etry o f dem and a nd te c hnology in b oth m ark e ts the
p o o l ing of ￿rm 2’ s n o-devi at i o n co nstrain ts d o es not a c tua l ly fa c il itate c ol lusion.
2 7
In
con trast, if the re w ou l db es o m e asym m etry across the m ar k ets, the p o oli ng of ￿rm 2’s
no- dev iation co nstrain ts could, i nf a c t, facil itate coll us i on .
28
Ca se 2: Inform ati on only on outcom e si nm ark et w here acti v e; no "inhe ren t"
li nk ages b et w e en m ar k e ts.
In this case ￿rm 1A a nd 1B do not observ e o utc om es i n the m ark e ti nw h i c h they do
not op erate. O nl y ￿ rm 2 observ es the o utc om es in b oth m ar k ets. Co nseq uen tl y ￿rm 2’s
no- dev iation c o nstrain t s canno t b e p o ole do v er the t w om ark e ts , unl ik e in the previ ou s
case.
F urtherm or e , in this c a se there are no dem a nd- or cos t-bas e dl ink ag e s acro ss the
m ark ets, nor a n y o the r cons train ts in￿uenci ng ￿rm 2 , w ho o p erates i n b oth m ark e ts .
Co nseq uen tl y , ￿rm s 1A, 1B and 2 b e ha v e as if there i s only a single m ark et, and the
no- dev iation co nstrain ts from the sta ndard si ng l e-m ark e tm o del apply .
Ca se 3: Info r m ation onl y o n outcom e si n m ark et w her e acti v e; ￿ r m 2 con-







As i n the previ ou s c a se, d ue to the i nform ation pro bl em s, ￿ rm 2’s no- de viation c on -
s t ra i n ts canno t b e p o o l ed o v er the t w om ar k ets. F urthe rm ore, t he re is an inhere n t
li nk ag e be t w e en m ark e t A an d B : ￿rm 2 is con straine d to p ro duce the sa m e qua n tit yi n
bot h m ar k ets. One i n terpre ta ti o n o f this c o nstrain t is as foll o ws : ￿rm 2 can on l yc o n tro l
the to tal qua n tit yo fi ts g o o d pro duce d, but it cann ot c on tro l in w hi c hm ark e t this q ua n-
tit y wil l actuall yb em ark e ted. Wh i le this cons t ra i n tm a ys e em som ewhat a rti ￿ci al ,i t
sho ul d no t b e tak e nt o ol iterall y .I t m ere ly s e rv e st oi l lustrate a m o re general p oten ti al
prob l em with m ul tim ar k et o p eration and coll us i on in exactl y the sa m e fra m ew ork of the
prev iou s sec tions. T o see this, si m ply rewrite ￿rm 2’s pro￿t equation, g i v e nb y (??) and









=2 [ ￿ ￿ ￿q
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See Ber nheim and Whi ns to n( 1 990), Pr o po si tion 1 ,p . 6.
2 8
Asym m e try m a y b e obtai ne d b ya ll o wing the param e ter s ￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ to di￿er across m ark ets ,
or b ya ll o wi ng ￿rm s to di￿er in m argina l cost s.26
The pro ￿t e qua ti on s o f ￿ r m 1A , 1B and 2 then are isom orphic to the pro￿ t e qua t ion s of
￿rm 1 , 3 an d 2 i n the m od e lo fl o cali ze d com p etiti on a naly zed i n the previ o us sec tions .
Co nseq uen tl y , the s am e inc en ti v e pro bl em s apply .I n pa rti cular, m ulti m ark e t ￿rm 2 m a y
not h a v e the nece s sary inc en ti v e to puni s h dev iations b y ￿rm 1A o r 1B, b e cau se th i s will






Ca se 3 i ll us trates a m ore g e ne r al pot e n tial pro bl em of c ol lusion under m ulti m ark et
op er at i o n: (i) i f the si ng l e-m ark e tc om p eti tors are no t i nf or m ed ab o ut the o utc om es in
the other m ark e ts , and (ii) i f t he ac tions of t he m ul tim ark et ￿rm nece s sary to sanction
devi ations i n one m ark et cause a n ex ternal ity o n the uninform e ds i ng l e-m ark e tc om pe ti-
tors i n the other m ark ets, then the m ul tim ar k et ￿rm m a ya c tu al ly no l o nger b e will ing
to exec ute the nec ess ary san c tions out o f fe a r for triggering a bre a k-do wn o f col lusion in
these other m ark e ts .
A nic ee c o nom i ce x am pl e of this p oten tial col lusion p r o ble m under m ulti m ark e t o p er-
ation i s the si m ple t w o- m ark et d uop ol ym o del as descri be da b o v e, b ut with pric e- settin g







, i .e. m ul tim ark et ￿rm 2 s hould s e t the sam e price i n bot h m ark et
A and B. T hi s m a y b e nice ly i n terpre ted a s a s tanda rd arbitrage cons tr ai n t. Am ore
detail ed analysis o f this m o del, foll o wing the a pproa c h of the presen t pa p er, could then
sho w that Bernhei m and Whinston’s con c lusion tha t m ulti m ark e tc om p eti tion fa c il itates
coll usion m a ya c tua l ly b e re v er se d : (i) due to the inform ation pro bl em s, p o oli n g of the
m ulti m ark et ￿rm ’ s no-devi at i o n cons trai n ts i sn ol o nger p ossible ; (ii ) due to the arbitrage
constra i n t, an e xternali t y arises reduci ng the m ulti m ark et ￿rm ’s i ncen tiv e to sanction
priv atel y o bserv ed devi ations in so m em ark ets.
Gi v en th e larg e e m piri cal li terature on m ulti m ark e tc o n ta c t and collusi v e b eha vi or ,
it w o uld b e i n tere st i ng to a l so em piri cally in v esti g ate in m or e de ta i l the re lationship
b et w e enm ul tim ar k et o p eration a bsen tm ulti m ark e tc on ta c t and co l lusiv e b eha vi or . F rom
a theoreti cal p e r spe c tiv e, the ab o v e a nalysi s sho w s th at m ul tim ar k et o p eration turns out
to b e disti nc t fro m m ult im ark et con tact.27
6 C o n clus ion
This pa p er has s tudi ed coll us i v eb e ha v ior in a rep eated o l igo p oly m o del w i th lo c al iz ed
com p eti tion, also rei n terpre ted as a m o del o f m ul tim ark et op e ra ti o n. Pri v a te inform ation
ab out the ri v als’ past actions na turall y arise s fro m these p ro duct m ark et structure s.
The resulti ng com m unication pro bl em si m pl y tha t ￿rm s sh ould no t ado pt stra te gi es
with to o s e v e re punishm e n ts. In￿ni te grim punishm en ts m a yb et o o s e v ere, for large
discoun t factors. The s tanda rd sti c k - and- c a rrot punishm e n ts fro m the p erfe ct publi c
inform ati on m o del are a l w a ys to o sev ere . Mo di￿e d stic k-a nd-carrot punishm e n ts can
stil l b e used, tho ugh for a s m al le r ran ge o f d i scou n t factors tha n the sta ndard stic k-a nd-
carrot puni sh m en ts.
Th e sp eci ￿c econo m ic m o del c ho se nm ade it p o ssibl e to form ali ze inform ation pro b-
le m s gene ra te db y the pro duct m ark et structure in a rel at i v e ly sim pl ew a y . The m o del
also a l lo w e df o rac los e com parison with the c ol lusion l ite ra ture under p erfe ct publ ic in-
form ation, an d fo r a rein terpretation as a m ode lo fm ul tim ark et op eration . N ev e rthel ess ,
it w ou l db ed e si rab l et oi n v e st i g ate ho w sensiti v e the resul ts are to so m e of the sp eci ￿c
as sum pti o ns. Do the re su l ts exte n d to alternativ ee con om i cm o dels where si m il ar p ri v ate
inform ati o n pro bl em sa r ise from the pro duct m ark e t struct ur e ?
A ￿rst al terna ti v ew o rth i n v e stiga ti ng is a tri o p oly m o del with pri ce-setti n g ￿rm s
rather than quan ti t y-setti n g ￿rm s. O n e p o ssibi lit yi s the w el l-kno wn Hotel li ng m o del of
lo cali zed c om pe titi on w i th three pric e-setting ￿rm s. I n this m o del three ￿rm s a re lo cated
o nal i ne, re presen ti ng a o ne dim ensiona l pro duct s pace .
29
An a l terna t iv e p o ssibi li t yi s
am o del o f m ul tim ar k et o p eration wi th pric e-s e tting ￿rm s a nd a cros s-m ark e t arbitrage
constra i n t, as a l read y su ggested ab o v e. Both p ossible m od e ls wil l generate e xa c tly the
sam ei n form ation s truc ture a s the m o del dev e lop e di n thi s pap e r. H o w ev er, the sp eci ￿c
eq ui li brium conditi on s w i ll di ￿ er, and it is no t cl ear ap r iori ho w this w i ll a￿ e ct the
prec ise results.
As e co nd a l terna t iv ei sam o del where the pri v a te inform ation structure is no longer
ex ac tly the sam e as in the presen t pap er. One i n tere st i n g po ss i bi li t yi s the S al op c i rcl e
m o del wi th m ore than three ￿rm s. In thi sv e rs i o n of the Hotel li ng m o del ￿rm s are
2 9
See Kats and Nev en (1990 ) for an a nalysis of the stati cv ers i on of this m o del.28
lo cated on a c irc le, rath e r than on a l ine.
30
This g e ne ra te s a rather di ￿e ren t inform ation
structure. A ￿ rm re al ize s tha t he c a nnot uni laterally "blo c k" i ts inform ati on a bou t a pa s t
devi ation: c ho o si ng whethe r o r not to com m unicate a pas t de viation, he reali zes that
inde p ende n t of his action the whole indus tr y wil le v en tua l ly b ec om e inform e d abo ut t h e
devi ation an yw a y , throug h the equi li br ium com m unications taki ng place at the other
side o f the de viator. More g e nera l ly sp e ak i ng , the Sa l op c irc le m od e li s a con v enie n t
m o del to ill ustra te com m unicati o n proble m si n m ark e ts w he re ￿rm s can o nl y delay an
ev en tu al puni sh m en t, but not com ple tel y pr e ven t it as in the pre se n tm od e l. Sim i lar
com m unic at i o n p roble m s, w i th del a yi ns te ad of c o m ple te prev en tion of the pu ni sh m en t,
m a y o ccur in m ark ets wi th m ulti dim ensiona l pro d uc td i ￿e ren ti at i on .
3 0
The li ne m o del wi th m ore than thr ee ￿r m s d oe s not se em to ge nerate in te res ti ng new insigh ts .29
A App endix








.T h e n i ti ss h o wn that








, ￿rm s sho ul d p ro duce thei r one-sho t b est-resp ons e qua n tit yi n
the com m unic at i o n sta te s.








. Then ￿rm i’ s, i 6 = 2, col lusion c o nstrain t (state c
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is giv en b y:































































] , whic h con tradic ts (??). This
















, the com m unic at i o n constra i n ts
for ￿rm 1 a nd 3, a nd for ￿rm 2 in m
1
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F or these ine qua l iti es to hold i ti s n e cessary (and for ￿rm i, i 6= 2, also su￿-







































































. This th e n sho ws Observ ation 1 . 2
Pro of of P rop ositi on 3.30
By d e ￿niti o n of the s tanda rd stic k-and- c a rrot pun i shm en t ￿rm 2 ’ s punishm e n t cons tr ai n t
i n ( ? ? ) is just s atis￿ed with eq ua l it y .I t m a yb ev eri ￿e d th at ￿rm 1’s pu ni sh m en tc on -





















)] ,w h i c hh o l ds a fte rs o m e




( 4 ￿ ￿ )
2
( 1 + ￿ )
: (A :2)
It can b e e a sil yv eri ￿ed that thi s condition i sv i ol at e d for 1 ￿ ￿> 0, g i v e n tha t (??)
sho ul d hold fo r ￿rm 2’s c ol lusion con strain t t ob es a t i s￿ed. This is s u￿ cie n t to pro v e
the prop ositi o n. (Note that it can an al og ou s l yb e c he c k ed that ￿ r m2 ’ s com m un i cation
constra i n t (??) i s violated for : 79 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0, giv en that (??) sho ul dh o l d for ￿rm 2’s
coll usion c o nstra i n tt o b es a t i s￿ e d.) 2
Pro of of P rop ositi on 4.




is not a p erfe ct









re m ain to b e cons i dered. (a) C onsider ^ q
p
, so that ￿rm 1 ’ s punish-
m e n t con strain t (??) is just satis￿ed w i th e qua l it y .F o r ￿rm 1’s c ol lusion co nstrain tt o














￿ 0. There fore
b y obs e rv at i o ns 2 a nd 3 ￿ rm 2’s collusi on an d pu n i sh m en t cons trai n ts are n on bi nd i ng .




,i t r e m ains to c hec ko n l y ￿rm 1’s coll us i on c o nstrain t and ￿ r m
2’s c om m uni cation constra i n t. These t w oi nequali t y cons trai n ts are extre m el yt e dious ,
but fortuna te ly they d e pe n d on on l yt w o p aram ete rs. H ence it is p o ssibl et oc ha racte riz e
these c o nstrain ts ful ly , using n um eric a l sim ulations . N um eri cal sim ul at i o ns sho wt h at for
￿ ￿ 0:11 7 these c o nstrain ts canno t b e si m ul ta ne o usly s atis￿ed, and tha t for ￿< 0 : 11 7






















is the u pp er b o und on the discoun t factor for ￿rm 2’s com m unic at i o n constra i n tt o
be sa t i s ￿ed. (b) Co nside r~ q
p
, so tha t ￿rm 2’s com m un i cation con strain t (??) i s just s at-
is￿ed with equali t y .F or ￿rm 1 ’ s coll usion constra i n tt o b es a t i s￿ e d , it turns out to b e














￿ 0 . Theref or e b yo b s e rv at i o ns 2 and 3 ￿rm 2’s




,i t r e m ains
to c hec k only ￿rm 1’s c ol lusion constra i n t and ￿rm 1 ’ s punishm en t constra i n t. Num eric al























is the lo w e r b oun d on the di sc ou n t factor for ￿rm 1’s punishm en tc o nstrain tt o
b e s atis￿ed.
Co m bini n g (a ) a nd (b), pa rt (ii ) of P rop o sit i o n4i m m e di ately foll o ws . F u rthe rn um er-














, from whic h part (i ) o f P r opo si tion
4 fol lo ws . 232
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